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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Tyson E. Madden appeals from his judgment of conviction for eluding a police
officer and DUI. Mr. Madden pleaded guilty but preserved the right to appeal from the
denial of his motion to dismiss the eluding charge. He asserts that the district court
erred by denying his motion because he had already been prosecuted for the same
offense in Washington.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedincls
The facts of this case are undisputed. (Tr., p.4, ~s.21-24.)' On May 26, 2007,
Mr. Madden stole a pickup truck in Coeur dlAlene. (Tr., p.6, Ls.2-9.) At a little before
midnight, an officer observed him driving without headlights and attempted to stop him.
(Tr., p.6, Ls.10-14.) Mr. Madden did not stop and a pursuit occurred, eventually leading
to lnterstate 90. (Tr., p.6, Ls.18-20.) While on Interstate 90, Mr. Madden crossed into
Washington. (Tr., p.6, Ls. 18-20.)
An officer from the Liberty Lake, Washington Police Department was called to
assist the ldaho officers.

(Tr., p.6, Ls.20-21.)

Mr. Madden crashed the truck in

Washington. (Tr., p.6, Ls.22-23.)
Mr. Madden was charged with, and he pleaded guilty to, possession of stolen
property and attempted eluding in Washington. (R., p.72-90.) He was subsequently
charged in ldaho with grand theft, eluding, and DUI. (R., p.41.) Mr. Madden filed a

'

Citations to the transcript in this brief are to the augmented transcript of the motion to
dismiss and the entry of the guilty plea, held December 7, 2006, and December 15,
2006.

motion to dismiss the grand theft and eluding charges on the basis that he had already
been prosecuted and pleaded guilty to those crimes in Washington. (R., p.54.)
The district court granted the motion with regard to the grand theft charge.
(Tr., p.16, Ls.20-21.)

The motion was denied with respect to the eluding charge,

however, with the district court making the following holding:
The difficulty with the eluding allegation is is you have behavior that can
occur separately and distinctly in each state. Now the state of Washington
apparently holds violation of the felony in the state of Washington by
running from law enforcement in the state of Washington in a reckless
manner, which is similar to our statute. But the behavior is separate,
independent and distinct in this court's estimation. When he stole the car
and he had possession of the car, nothing changed when he crossed state
lines. He had one singular crime that could be prosecuted essentially in
either state. But there was nothing that required him to continue running
from law enforcement in a reckless fashion in the state of Washington.
And so there is a distinct act in the state of Washington where motoring
members of the public were jeopardized by his reckless conduct in that
particular state. And by not adhering to the directives of law enforcement
in that particular state, I think, is a distinct and separate offense from his
behavior on the roadways here in the state of ldaho. He had simply driven
recklessly here in the state of Idaho, crossed state lines and then slowly
and calmly and still not pulled over for law enforcement, it would be two
separate and distinct crimes as well.
But I think there's a real distinction between the two offense that are in
front of the court. And I don't feel satisfied that the provisions of 19-315
are applicable to count 1 [eluding]. So I'm prepared to grant the motion to
dismiss count 2 [grand theft] in this case. I'll deny the motion with respect
to eluding a peace officer in count 1 .
(Tr., p.15

- L.17 - p.16,

L.22.) Mr. Madden subsequently entered into a conditional

guilty plea in which he preserved the right to appeal from the denial of the motion to
dismiss the eluding charge. (R., p.107.) This appeal followed. (R., p.126.)

ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Madden's motion to dismiss the eluding charge
where Mr. Madden had already pleaded guilty to eluding in Washington in a case
involving the same conduct that is at issue in this case?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Madden's Motion To Dismiss The Eluding
Charqe Because Mr. Madden Had Already Pleaded Guilty To Eludina In Washinclton In
A Case lnvolvincl The Same Conduct That Is At lssue In This Case
A.

Introduction
Because Mr. Madden pleaded guilty to eluding in Washington, he asserts that the

district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the eluding charge in ldaho
because it involves the same course of conduct.
B.

The District Court Erred Bv Denying Mr. Madden's Motion To Dismiss The
Eludin~Charge Because Mr. Madden Had Already Pleaded Guilty To Eludinq In
Washington In A Case lnvolvina The Same Conduct That Is At lssue In This

Case
In Washington, Mr. Madden was charged with attempting to elude a police
vehicle, which required proof that Mr. Madden, "in the State of Washington, on or about
May 26, 2006, did willfully fail and refuse to immediately bring his vehicle to a stop and
did drive his vehicle in a reckless manner while attempting to elude a pursuing police
vehicle after being given a visual or audible sign to bring the vehicle to a stop .

. . ."

(R., p.73.) In Idaho, it was alleged that, on May 26, 2006, in the County of Kootenai,
Mr. Madden "willfully eluded andlor attempted to elude a police vehicle after being given
a visual signal andlor audible signal to stop," that he drove his vehicle in excess of thirty
miles per hour over the speed limit, andlor drove in a manner likely to endanger the
property andlor person of another, andlor left the state of ldaho. (R., p.42.) There can
be no dispute, therefore, that Mr. Madden's two charges stemmed from the same act of
eluding ldaho and Washington officers on May 26, 2006.

Mr. Madden's motion was based on I.C. § 19-315. It states, "[wlhen an act
charged as a public offense, is within the venue of another state, territory, or country, as
we// as of this state, a conviction or acquittal thereof in the former is a bar to the
prosecution or indictment therefore in this state." I.C.

3 19-315 (emphasis added.) By

its own terms, the statute applies to a crime that occurs in ldaho as well as another
state. There can be no dispute that the eluding that occurred in this case occurred in
Washington as well as Idaho. Thus, under the terms of the statute, Mr. Madden's
conviction for eluding in Washington serves as a bar to prosecution in ldaho because
the act occurred in Washington as well as ldaho.
This statute has been rarely interpreted in ldaho. It was addressed recently,
however, by the Court of Appeals. See Cook v. State, 145 ldaho 482, 180 P.3d 521
(Ct. App. 2008.)

In Cook, the petitioner raised a claim that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss on the basis that he had already been
subject to the same charges in federal and Utah prosecutions. Id. at 491, 180 P.3d at
530. The district court found that none of the crimes Mr. Cook pleaded guilty to in ldaho
were covered by the other prosecutions. Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that "the
key question is whether Cook was actually charged with a crime in federal court for his

actions in ldaho." Id. The Court further stated, "passing references to his activities in
ldaho would not be sufficient to indict him for his illegal acts there" and, further, there
was "no reason to believe that the indictment was meant to cover the scheme in regard
to ldaho victims where it carefully laid out each count, complete with the names and
residences of the victims, and there was no such care taken in regard go the ldaho

acts." Id. Therefore, the court concluded, "Cook was indicted in federal court only for
the portion of his activities which victimized Wyoming citizens." Id.
The facts of this case are very different.

Mr. Madden was convicted in

Washington for a crime that began in ldaho and was indisputably the same course of
conduct that occurred on May 26, 2006. Unlike the Cook case, where the petitioner
was charged with multiple acts occurring in multiple states, Mr. Madden's actions
cannot be individually split

- all that happened in this

case is that, during the chase,

Mr.Madden happen to cross the state line and a Washington officer joined the pursuit.
Mr. Madden's crime occurred in Washington as well as ldaho, and therefore, 1.C. § 19315 clearly applies.
Further, the district court's rationale is incorrect. The district court held that there
was a "distinct act" in Washington that endangered the motorists of that state.
(Tr., p.16, Ls.5-8.) Because, the court concluded, that Mr. Madden eluded officers in
both Washington and ldaho, he could be charged in both Washington and ldaho. The
fault in this rationale is that it overlooks the language of section 19-315, which prohibits
double prosecutions for crimes that occur in two states. While the crime of eluding
carried over to Washington, the crime was still being committed in ldaho as well as
Washington, and I.C. 3 19-315 still applies.
Finally, to the extent that this Court considers the meaning of section 19-315 to
unclear, ldaho has adopted the rule of lenity in interpreting criminal statutes, holding
that "criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of defendants." State v.
Barnes, 124 Idaho 379, 859 P.2d 1387 (1993). Thus, to the extent this Court finds
I.C. § 19-315 to be ambiguous, this statute must be strictly construed in favor of

Mr. Madden to prohibit a prosecution for the crime of eluding that occurred in Idaho as
well as Washington.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Madden requests that his conviction for eluding be dismissed.
DATED this 25'h day of September, 2008.
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